The fate of presentism in modern physics by Wuthrich, Christian
The fate of presentism in modern physics
Christian Wu¨thrich∗
Forthcoming in Roberto Ciunti, Kristie Miller, and Giuliano Torrengo (eds.), New Papers
on the Present—Focus on Presentism, Philosophia Verlag, Munich.
Abstract
There has been a recent spate of essays defending presentism, the view in the metaphysics
of time according to which all and only present events or entities exist. What is particularly
striking about this resurgence is that it takes place on the background of the significant pressure
exerted on the position by the relativity of simultaneity asserted in special relativity, and yet in
several cases invokes modern physics for support. I classify the presentist arguments into a two
by two matrix depending on whether they take a compatibilist or incompatibilist stance with
respect to both special relativity in particular and modern physics in general. I then review and
evaluate what I take to be some of the most forceful and intriguing presentist arguments turning
on modern physics. Although nothing of what I will say eventuates its categorical demise, I
hope to show that whatever presentism remains compatible with empirical facts and our best
physics is metaphysically repugnant.
1 Introduction: ersatzist presentism
Defining ‘presentism’ in a way that saves it from being trivially false yet metaphysically substan-
tively distinct from eternalism is no mean feat, as the first part of this collection testifies. In
Wu¨thrich (forthcoming), I have offered an attempt to achieve just this, arguing that this is best
done in the context of modern spacetime theories. Here, I shall refrain from going through all
the motions again and simply state the characterization of an ersatzist version of presentism as it
has emerged from considerations there. Any acceptable formulation of presentism should remain
neutral among competing spacetime theories in order to enable the present project of assessing
the compatibility of presentism with various theories of modern physics, including both spacetime
theories and theories of physical processes situated in a spatiotemporal setting.
The main issue in the triviality debate as I see it concerns the representation of events without an
accompanying ontological commitment. If the presentist can find a way to represent non-present
events without eo ipso committing herself to their existence, then expressing her metaphysical
disagreement with the eternalist seems rather straightforward. This naturally leads to an ersatzist
position which introduces non-present events merely for representational purposes without imbuing
them with physical existence.
The vantage point of modern spacetime theories is the presupposition of a four-dimensional
manifold M with certain topological and differential structure. Furthermore, the manifold M is
∗I am indebted to Ada´n Sus and Giuliano Torrengo for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Work on this
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Fellowship, the University of California through a UC President’s Fellowship in the Humanities, and the University
of California, San Diego through an Arts and Humanities Initiative Award.
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equipped with a metric field gab which encodes all the information concerning the spatiotemporal
relations among all the points ofM. Eternalism and presentism are then taken to disagree as to over
which points ofM they quantify when quantifying over all spatiotemporal events where physically
existing entities can be located. In this context, eternalism is understood as the position claiming
physical existence for all events inM. In contrast, presentism partitionsM into past, present, and
future events. This partition results, e.g., from assuming an equivalence relation S (‘simultaneity’)
to be defined on M such that the equivalence classes contain co-temporal events. Time, on this
view, is the one-dimensional linearly ordered quotient set of these equivalence classes. One such
equivalence class is privileged in that it contains the ‘present’ events, the set of equivalence classes
to its past according to this ordering contains the ‘past’ events and the set of equivalence classes
to its future the ‘future’ events. Obviously, the sets of all past and future events thus have further
structure indicating just how much to the past or future a particular event is located. Thus, the
sum total of physical existence according to the presentist is a proper subset of that according to
the eternalist.
An obvious worry arising from this manner of characterizing the position is that presentism does
not just amount to the assertion that only present events or entities exist, but also that the present
undergoes a dynamical ‘updating’, or exhibits a quality as of a fleeting whoosh, and that this
additional dynamical aspect is what threatens the substance of the debate between the presentist
and her eternalist opponent. In order to capture this dynamical quality, the thought goes, the
presentist must quantify not just over the events contained in one equivalence class corresponding
to the present present, but also over all events in all the other equivalence classes containing the
past and future presents. Once this point is granted, it seems as though presentism deflates into
admitting all the events of M as existing. But this clearly misses the presentist’s point: the
presentist’s sum total of existence remains a proper subset of the eternalist’s, fleeting whoosh or
not. I am not pretending as if to characterize in satisfactory detail what exactly constitutes this
dynamical quality is without difficulty. But for present purposes, presentism should be understood
as a merely ontological hypothesis making an assertion as to what exists, and not an ideological
statement about the qualities—dynamical or otherwise—of that which exists. Perhaps this is a
mistake. But if it is, at least not without precedent.
The remainder of this essay shall assume, however fallibly, that presentism is a metaphysically
substantive thesis markedly different from eternalism. It contends that physical existence is re-
stricted to a spatially extended manifold of events simultaneous with the here-now. This view
comes under severe pressure from modern physics, most notably from special relativity (SR), as
shall be explicated in Section 2. The source of the tension is found in the fact that in SR, and
hence in modern physics, space and time are intertwined in a way such that whether two given
spacetime events exemplify the relation of simultaneity is no longer an absolute and global matter.
But if simultaneity cannot serve as on absolute and global basis for determining whether or not a
spatially distant event is present (in the temporal sense), then we seem to lack an objective basis
on which matters of physical existence could turn for a presentist metaphysic.
Naturally, presentists have responded to the challenge. The problem, of course, should not be
misconstrued as dealing with an in principle insurmountable inconsistency between presentism and
physics; rather, the challenge amounts to grounding the necessary distinctions (past, present, and
future) in a way that is responsive to modern physics while remaining faithful to presentist intu-
itions. The presentist responses to this challenge, both actually stated and hitherto unarticulated,
shall be chronicled in the remainder of this essay, together with an assessment of the prospects
of success and the price tag for each response. In an attempt to bring order into the variegated
multitude of presentist strategies to counter the challenge from modern physics, a systematization
is offered in Section 3. The basic distinction of presentist responses is into compatibilist and in-
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compatibilist strategies, with the former arguing that presentism is compatible with the truth of
SR despite initial appearances and the latter accepting their incompatibility while rejecting that
this entails the denial of presentism. It turns out to be useful to introduce a distinction orthogonal
to the one between compatibilism and incompatibilism: presentism can not only be compatible or
incompatible with respect to SR, but to fundamental physics—contemporary or prospective. This
distinction derives its utility from the fact that there are a number of presentist retorts readily ad-
mitting that their view is inconsistent with SR but insisting on its compatibility with fundamental
physics.
These two distinctions span a matrix of four types of strategies. The two boxes of strategies
accepting an incompatibility with contemporary, and possibly future, fundamental physics will be
examined in Section 3. Responses purporting a compatibility with either contemporary or at least
future fundamental physics will be dealt with in Sections 4, if they also allege a compatibility with
SR, and 5, if they accept that presentism is inconsistent with SR. Section 6 will take stock and dare
a rather negative comprehensive appraisal of the prospects of presentism to survive the pressure
from modern physics in any form that permits retaining its appeal.
2 The challenge issued by special relativity
If by presentism we thus mean the thesis according to which there exists an absolute spatially
extended present and all there is is spatiotemporally located in this present, then a strong argument
can be offered to the effect that such a position is precluded if SR is at least approximately true.
The goal of this section is to carefully develop this argument.
Starting out from two major premises,1 SR asserts a certain structure of space and time. In
1908, Hermann Minkowski showed that this inferred structure is best captured by postulating
a four-dimensional manifold of ‘events’, i.e. of dimensionless points, which is differentiable and
endowed with the additional structure of a time orientation and a metric field encoding the absolute
spatiotemporal—but not the spatial or temporal—separation between events. In fact—and this cuts
to the core of the difficulty for the presentist—, there simply is no absolute spatial or temporal
measure of separation in SR. In Minkowski’s famous words: “Henceforth space by itself, and time
by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will
preserve an independent reality.” (Minkowski 1952, 75; translation of Minkowski (1908)) What is
absolute, i.e. independent of a frame of reference, is only the union of space and time; in contrast,
the totality of space at a particular time is only even defined relative to a frame of reference. This
means that there simply is no absolute and objective truth concerning which spatially distant events
are simultaneous with the event representing the here and now.
Let us state this with slightly more rigour. From the two premises mentioned, it follows that
the uniquely correct way to transform the time and space coordinates of events—and hence the
assignment of temporal and spatial location—of two different inertial frames in relative motion is
by employing so-called ‘Lorentz transformations’. Somewhat imprecisely, Lorentz transformations
are a kind of hyperbolic rotation in a mathematical space including a time direction.2 Apart from
all the other fun consequences of Lorentz-transforming physical systems such as time dilation,
1And some minor ones, such as the homogeneity and isotropy of space and time. The two major axioms of SR
are the Light Postulate, according to which “light propagates through empty space with a definite velocity which is
independent of the state of motion of the emitting body” (Einstein 1905, 891), and the Relativity Principle, according
to which “the same laws of electrodynamics and optics will be valid for all frames of reference for which the equations
of mechanics hold good [i.e., for inertial frames]” (ibid.).
2For an intuitive derivation and illustration, Janssen (forthcoming) is highly recommended. Giulini (2010) is a
good source for the more technical aspects of Minkowski spacetime.
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Figure 1: Einstein-Poincare´ convention for synchronizing distant clocks in two reference frames
related by a Lorentz transformation
length contraction, and the infamous twin paradox, Lorentz transformations also have profound
consequences for the temporal (and spatial) ordering of events. To see how Lorentz transformations
affect this ordering, consider the so-called Einstein-Poincare´ convention for synchronizing spatially
distant clocks by means of light rays, illustrated in Figure 1. According to this convention, a
spatially distant point p is simultaneous with an event b in the rest frame of a clock just in case a
light ray is reflected back to the clock at p such that the same duration lies between the events a
of the emission of the light ray and b as does between the event c of the reception of the light ray
and b. In other words,
t(b) = t(p)⇔ t(b)− t(a) = t(c)− t(b),
where t(e) gives the time coordinate of any event e ∈ M in the unprimed reference frame. If we
Lorentz transform into another reference frame—with transformed coordinates or manifold points
denoted by primes—and apply the same convention to determine the set of spatially distant events
that are simultaneous with b ≡ b′, it becomes evident that the set of spatially distant simultaneous
events is different in different reference frames. For starters, the point p on the unprimed x-axis is
not simultaneous with b ≡ b′ according to the primed frame:
t′(b) 6= t′(p).
Instead, the primed frame evaluates the event b ≡ b′ as simultaneous with an event p′, which is
later than p (in both frames) and hence not simultaneous with b according to the unprimed frame:
t′(b′) = t′(p′),
t(b′) 6= t(p′).
In short, for an inertial observer at rest with respect to the unprimed frame, all the spacetime
events on the x-axis are simultaneous with b, whereas for an inertial observer at rest with respect
to the primed frame, those spacetime events on the x′-axis are simultaneous with b′ ≡ b. Hence,
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the simultaneity of distant events is no longer absolute but only relative to inertial frames once one
accepts the Lorentz symmetry demanded by SR.3
The presentist asks us to be realist about all events and objects in the present, but no others.
Lest the position collapses to a solipsistic denial of the reality of anything at a spatial distance,
she thus needs to procure an account of what we are to include among the things present—and
to exclude as not being part of the present. In other words, presentism must involve an at least
implicit commitment to a way to determine the simultaneity, and hence co-presence, of spatially
distant events with the vantage point of the here and now. Prior to the advent of relativistic physics,
such a commitment was both unambiguous and unproblematic insofar as pre-relativistic physics
readily offered a robust notion of absolute simultaneity. But relativity appears to pull the rug from
underneath any metaphysical view which relies on an objective, i.e. absolute, determination of what
is past, present, and future.
An argument against metaphysical views of time that postulate or entail that the future is
genuinely open in the sense that it is not (yet) real, or does not (yet) exist, as of the present moment
has been advanced by Wim Rietdijk (1966) and Hilary Putnam (1967).4 This argument starts out
from the assumption that the task at hand is to determine the set of spatially distant spacetime
events which are simultaneous, and hence co-present, with the here-now, the vantage point from
which the present is thus to be constructed. As a next step, invoke the equivalence relation S which
we found in §1 the presentist to rely on. Physically, this binary relation is interpreted to signify
the simultaneity between two spacetime events. Mathematically, it enables the partitioning of the
spacetime events into equivalence classes of events, ordered by a time parameter. Metaphysically,
it creates the sets of co-existing events. On a presentist metaphysics, to repeat, one of these
equivalence classes is privileged in that its elements alone exist concretely. In these terms, the
task can be characterized as that of being handed an event representing the here-now and a binary
relation S which we are to use to determine which other events exist.
As a consequence of the relativity of simultaneity found in SR, if event b denotes the here-now
as in Figure 1, there is no frame-independent way to determine the set of events that stand in
relation S to b. As far as the unprimed frame of reference is concerned, we have Sbp. In the
primed frame, however, we find that ¬Sbp but Sbp′. Since S is an equivalence relation, and hence
transitive, whichever events stand in S to events which stand in S to b should also stand in S to b.
If the qualification that whether two events stand in S or not can only be determined with respect
to a frame of reference is omitted, then the transitivity of S seems to entail that, since there exists
an event q such that Sbq (in some frame) and Sqc (in some (other) frame), it is the case that Sbc.
See Figure 2 for an example of such an event q, with b and c related as in the left-hand side of
Figure 1. But this is absurd: S is supposed to be a relation of simultaneity, yet c is clearly to the
future of b! That c is to the future of b, importantly, is frame-independent and hence agreed on by
all inertial observers. But if it is absolutely and objectively the case that c is to the future of b,
they cannot stand in any relation that can sensibly be interpreted as a relation of simultaneity.
3One might be tempted to think that the problem only arises because simultaneity is conventional, as was implied
above when I started out from the Einstein-Poincare´ convention of simultaneity. But this would be missing the point:
while different conventions are surely possible, the Einstein-Poincare´ convention is uniquely suited for presentist
purposes as it maintains the symmetry of simultaneity (within a fixed frame) by choosing the midpoint between
a and c, while other conventions would not help against the relativity of simultaneity and make things worse by
frivolously giving up the symmetry of the relation. In fact, non-standard conventions of simultaneity could threaten
presentism already in pre-relativistic physics. But this threat could easily be averted by choosing a sensible (standard)
convention of what it is to be simultaneous.
4The sense in which the future is supposed to be genuinely open is important to note, as eternalism is arguably
consistent with at least some forms of indeterminism. For a reading of Rietdijk’s and Putnam’s argument as an
argument to the conclusion that SR is deterministic, see Rakic´ (1997, §4.3).
5
q00t
00x
x
t
c
b
Figure 2: What the transitivity of simultaneity can do: Sbq in the unprimed frame, Sqc in the
doubly primed frame
Note that the absurdity is rampant: for any pair of events a and b in the manifold M of
Minkowski spacetime, there exists an event c ∈ M such that Sac and Sbc and hence Sab. Hence,
S is the universal binary relation on the set of events M. But surely a presentist would not want
to be bound by an ontological commitment to all events in spacetime. From this consequence,
both Rietdijk and Putnam have concluded that any metaphysical position marking ontological
distinctions along a relation of simultaneity is thus reduced to absurdity.
Of course, one might interject that to let the transitivity of S act across different reference
frames is illicit; the central lesson of the relativity of simultaneity in SR is that such transitivity
only obtains within the same reference frame. In fact, while simultaneity remains an equivalence
relation, it might be argued, once we accept the Lorentz symmetry of SR it does so only within
each frame. If this point is heeded, it might then be concluded, the argument above no longer
goes through. True, but to concede that the transitivity ought to be restricted to within the same
reference frames and hence that simultaneity is equally restricted to reference frames surely seems
to concede too much as far as the presentist is concerned. After all, presentism relies, it seems, on
an absolute notion of simultaneity in order to make absolute ontological claims.
Without going into the details of presentist responses to this challenge just yet, let us also
note that it won’t suffice for the presentist to merely reject the way of constructing a spatially
extended present as offered in this section. The presentist might be tempted to argue that the
argument presented here does not even get to the starting block as the idea of starting out from
some privileged or arbitrarily chosen spacetime event (the ‘here-now’) and then trying to identify
those events simultaneous to it. Instead, she might be tempted to think, the present and what
is contained in it is primitively given, it is there ‘at once’, prior to us doing any physics. But
suppose that’s the case. It would then still be true that, if you hand me just one event as being
an element of the present (or, eo ipso according to the presentist, of physical reality), the set
of all primitively given elements of the present would form a three-dimensional submanifold of
Minkowski spacetime containing the one starting point. I don’t see how this move does not amount
to privileging one particular way of carving up spacetime into equivalence classes of simultaneous
events and, furthermore, of privileging one particular such equivalence class as the ‘present’, be
that primitive or not.
The presentist might retort that this way of conceiving of the problem does not get started if
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we don’t help ourselves to this one event from which we subsequently try to construct the rest of
the present. But surely, she might continue, the positing of such a vantage point is wrongful, at
least without some further motivation. True, if this opening move is barred, the challenge can’t
be constructed as above. But I fail to see what the presentist could win from disallowing it. She
would claim, in essence, that all and only present events and objects are part of physical reality
and that there is in principle no way of determining even one element of this physical reality. Lest
we permit ourselves to lapse into obscurantism, the presentist ought to accept the challenge as it
stands—particularly given the plethora of more interesting responses available to her.
3 A taxonomy of presentist responses to the challenge
Let us then consider and classify actual, and possible but unstated, presentist responses to the
argument as outlined in Section 2. The basic distinction I wish to use in systematizing presentist
reactions is that between compatibilism and incompatibilism between presentism and SR. Versions
of compatibilism with SR assert that, despite appearances, SR and presentism are perfectly com-
patible in that they can jointly and consistently be maintained. Juxtaposed, we find varieties of
incompatibilism with SR, which accept the argument as given in §2, but reject that it entails the
denial of presentism. Clearly, then, an incompatibilist of this kind is thus obliged to reject SR.
For some, such a move is justified on the background of their rather sweeping rejection of physics
as a science whose task it is to unveil facts about our physical world that a philosopher ought to
take into account when constructing metaphysical theories. But there are others in this camp who,
while rejecting SR, are adamant about dismissing such an attitude of wholesale rejection of physics
as being irrelevant to the task at hand. For them, a metaphysics blatantly contradicting our best
physical theories is indefensible. An incompatibilist of this sort, then, has to deny that SR, at least
as standardly understood, is among our best physical theories.5
In order to make room for this additional distinction, it seems sensible to distinguish between
more encompassing forms of both compatibilism and incompatibilism, not just with SR, but with
modern physics in toto, i.e., with contemporary, or in fact prospective, fundamental physics. Since
it is at least logically possible to sever the two distinctions and be, e.g., an incompatibilist with
respect to SR but not modern physics in total, they are strictly speaking orthogonal and give rise
to a two-by-two matrix of four distinct types of presentist strategies in the face of the challenge
mounted in §2, as follows:
compatibilism with SR incompatibilism with SR
compatiblism with presentism compatible with presentism incompatible with
modern physics both SR and physics SR, but compatible with physics
incompatibilism with presentism compatible with SR, presentism incompatible with
modern physics but incompatible with physics both SR and physics
Table 1: The matrix of distinct types of presentist strategies
While all four options are logically possible, it is evident that they are not all equally attractive.
The lower left box in Table 1, for instance, has not been defended in print, to the best of my
knowledge. This is hardly surprising, for why should a presentist go at any length establishing
compatibility with SR, only to then concede that it remains incompatible with fundamental physics.
If a defender of presentism estimates her theory to be in conflict with fundamental physics, why
5Note that, as will subsequently become clear, what exactly SR is taken to assert or entail will be of paramount
importance when judging the (in)compatibility of presentism with it.
7
spend any effort to defend its consonance with SR? Such a strategy would therefore only appear
to be rational, it seems, if one believed that the irreconcilability of presentism with other theories
in physics can be dispelled in ways that one with SR could not. But there is no reason to believe
that that is the case: as will become clearer below, the reason why theories in fundamental physics
clash with presentism, if any, is that we ask them to respect the Lorentz symmetry demanded by
SR. In a sense, then, the conflict arises because of, and to the extent to which, fundamental physics
is required to be special-relativistic. It seems odd, then, to argue for a compatibility of presentism
and SR, while maintaining a discordance between presentism and other theories in fundamental
physics. Consequently, I will not consider potential presentist responses that would fall in the lower
left quadrant of Table 1 any further.
What about the box on the lower right-hand side? The acceptance of a conflict between presen-
tism and not only SR, but all of current, as well as prospective, fundamental physics paired with
an insistence on presentism amounts to a rather comprehensive rejection of physics. It thus funda-
mentally contravenes naturalism, a venerable tradition going back at least to Aristotle. According
to naturalism, philosophical—and metaphysical—inquiry is continuous with scientific inquiry. To
be sure, naturalism is not a logical truth—it is a substantive philosophical thesis. But it is one
whose defence has to wait for another day; for present purposes, I simply assume a minimal natu-
ralism which demands that no philosophical thesis be in manifest contradiction to facts established
by our best science. Restricting this weak thesis to metaphysics, it can be translated as necessi-
tating that the physically possible worlds are a subset of the metaphysically possible ones, for if
the metaphysical theories were in contradiction to the physical ones, then there would have to be
some physically possible worlds (and perhaps all) which are metaphysically impossible, as for the
metaphysical theory to be incompatible with physics, it would have to rule out some physically
possible worlds as impossible.6 In other words, metaphysics would a priori deem impossible what
physics affirms is possible. Assuming that all physically possible worlds are also logically possible,
I see little justification for disavowing this weak form of naturalism.
In what follows, I shall hence assume that the most attractive presentist strategies are to be
found in the camp espousing compatibilism with fundamental physics. This leaves us with the top
two boxes of Table 1, and thus with either compatibilism or incompatibilism with respect to SR.
4 Compatibilism with special relativity
There are various ways in which one could work out a compatibilist response (regarding both SR
and physics in general). An obvious way to do so would be to accept a modification of the presen-
tist position such that the reformulated thesis is compatible with Lorentz symmetry. Although this
would not by itself guarantee that the reformulated position is compatible with any future funda-
mental physical theory, it would remove any immediate reason for believing that it couldn’t be. Of
course, given that we do not currently have at our disposal the final and true fundamental theory, it
would be illusory to seek such a guarantee. Thus, a compatibilist must content herself with making
an informed bet on which parts of our current physics are likely to be retained, in a sufficiently
similar form, in the final theory. Accordingly, the modifications required for compatibilism can
only conform to what our currently best judgments concerning this are.
Apart from modifying the presentist thesis, there are, broadly speaking, at least two further
ways for the full compatibilist to work out an answer. As a second option, one can argue that SR,
and any other relevant physical theory, are not about time, or at least not about the same sort
6Of course, this also presupposes that the “facts established by our best science” get translated as those facts
compatible with the laws of our best physical theories.
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of time as the presentist is concerned with. Since their objects are thus distinct, there could not
possibly be an inconsistency between presentism and physical theories. Hence, they are perfectly
compatible; and since this reasoning applies to any future physical theory, this argument concludes,
we can remain happy compatibilists until the end of time.
The third—and surprisingly popular—option denies that SR, properly interpreted, involves
or entails an assertion to the effect that there cannot be any absolute, i.e. observer-independent,
simultaneity relation S. In fact, proponents of this strategy insist, what SR does prohibit is only
that any such absolute simultaneity could not be detected in principle and would hence remain
empirically completely inaccessible. Thus, SR does not preclude the existence of an absolute, non-
empirical S. Since such an S does exist, though undetectably so, there is no problem in identifying
the spatially distant events which are co-present with the here-now. To be sure, this identification
cannot be executed in practice, as S must remain behind a principled veil of ignorance, but the
possibility that it exists assures the presentist that there can be a privileged simultaneity relation
and thus an objectively distinguished present. So if SR is interpreted as to only imply that there
cannot exist an absolute S which can also be detected, but not to entail that there cannot be an
absolute non-empirical S, then presentism remains compatible with SR and arguably with all of
physics.
In sum, then, it appears as if the compatibilist can select among three different routes: either
insist that SR and presentism talk about different things and hence circumvent the issue of com-
patibility, or modify presentism such as to eliminate any tension with SR, or re-interpret—and
arguably modify—SR such that it no longer entails that there cannot be absolute non-empirical
simultaneity. Let me discuss these options in some more detail.
The first road claims that SR, unlike presentism, is not really a theory about ‘time’, in spite of
any appearances to the contrary. Perhaps the most prominent proponent of this view was Arthur
Prior. We find the clearest expression in one of his posthumously published essays:
[W]e may say that the theory of relativity isn’t about real space and time, in which the
earlier-later relation is defined in terms of pastness, presentness, and futurity; the ‘time’
which enters the so-called space-time of relativity theory isn’t this, but is just part of
an artificial framework which the scientists have constructed to link together observed
facts in the simplest way possible, and from which those things which are systematically
concealed from us are quite reasonably left out. (1996, 50f; emphasis in original)
Prior claims, in effect, that the ‘time’ in SR is of merely instrumental value, used in physics as
an ordering parameter of in principle observable events. Real time (and space) which are defined
relationally in terms of pastness, presentness, and futurity, he implies, is systematically concealed
from us, as of course it has to on pains of violating the Lorentz symmetry demanded by SR. His
implication that there is, ontologically speaking, an absolute and objective fact of the matter where
events stand in terms of their pastness, presentness, and futurity, even though this fact must remain
forever invisible to us, comes awfully close to the third way of giving a compatibilist response as I
have sketched it above. In fact, more than a score years earlier, though still posthumously, Prior
wrote that
[o]ne possible reaction to this situation, which to my mind is perfectly respectable
though it isn’t very fashionable, is to insist that all that physics has shown to be true or
likely is that in some cases we can never know, we can never physically find out, whether
something is actually happening, or merely has happened or will happen. (1972, 323;
emphases in original)
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It is obvious why this view is not as fashionable as perhaps Prior would have hoped (although
it’s still surprisingly popular): it constitutively asserts what cannot be known. Even though Prior
seems insufficiently impressed by this principled ignorance—he believes it to only apply to “some
cases”—, it is important to emphasize just how generic it is: although we can determine events in
the past lightcone of the here-now to be past as causal signals emanating from them can in principle
reach the here-now, no spatially distant event can ever be known, or “physically found out”, to
be present. The only event of which we can ascertain its presentness, and hence, according to the
presentist, its very existence, is the here-now. Hence, the principled epistemic strictures imposed
by SR are much more constraining than Prior seems to realize.
It should also be stressed that Prior seems to accept the challenge as it has been set up in §2,
as whether a spacelike related event is co-present with the here-now, “[o]n the view of presentness
which [he has] been suggesting, this is always a sensible question.” (Prior 1972, 322; emphasis in
original) The task, according to him, is exactly to identify a relation not just of simultaneity with
respect to a frame of reference, but of simultaneity tout court. Thus, Prior accepts the challenge as
it stands and appears to vacillate in his response between saying that SR and presentism refer to
different things when they state ‘time’ and thus cannot be incompatible, and saying that SR leaves
open the possibility of an absolute, non-empirical relation of simultaneity. These responses need
not be different, of course. Properly disambiguated, for instance, the different referents of ‘time’ on
the first view entails different referents of ‘simultaneity’ and in this sense the first view entails the
third view held by the earlier Prior. Conversely, however, one could certainly maintain the third
view without any commitment regarding the first view.
One who defends the third view without apparent commitment to the first view is John Lucas
(1989). Lucas also maintains that presentism does not violate any of the empirical consequences
of SR and is thus compatible with it by pointing out that “[t]he divine canon of simultaneity
implicit in the instantaneous acquisition of knowledge by an omniscient being” (220) is perfectly
compatible with SR, as there may be “a divinely preferred frame of reference” (ibid.).7 Theology
aside, the idea is to stipulate unobservable extra-structure in the form of an absolute simultaneity
relation in order to satisfy an appetite dictated by a metaphysical agenda. Many presentists defend
versions of this response, among them Ned Markosian (2004, §3.9) and Dean Zimmerman (2008),
even though Markosian’s stance is less committal concerning what exactly SR does or does not
entail. In fact, Markosian only asserts the disjunction that either this third compatibilist view is
correct or else SR entails that there cannot be such an absolute simultaneity relation, in which case,
however, SR must be rejected on incompatibilist grounds and based on “good a priori evidence”
(75). Zimmerman accepts that SR encodes the geometry of spacetime, but denies that this entails
any ontological consequences. In particular, nothing in SR prohibits an absolute non-empirical
simultaneity relation whose existence Zimmerman asserts.
If this stipulation of extra-structure is motivated purely by a presentist metaphysics, we better
have very good reasons for believing presentism. The usual justifications for presentism trade on
intuitions allegedly grounded in common sense which are said to powerfully demand that only
presently existing things really exist. I, for one, only have weak intuitions regarding these matters;
so weak that they are easily trumped by reasoned argument. But suppose another philosopher’s
intuitions are so strong as to warrant this step. Still donning our naturalist hat, it seems odd
that many humans would have evolved intuitions that must depend on a structure which cannot
be detected in principle. So either philosophers overestimate the extent to which humans have
intuitions of the requisite kind or else these intuitions do not ontologically depend on an ultimately
7A later incarnation of Lucas, found in Lucas (1999), defends an incompatibilist version of a similar idea by
affirming an in principle observable preferred frame. I will return to this in §5.
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unobservable extra-structure such as absolute simultaneity. Most likely, of course, these intuitions—
to the extent to which we have them—arose as an adaptation useful for beings operating at human
scales, with the slow motions predominant in our empirical world.
Returning to the first view, according to which SR and presentism simply talk about different
things, the main problem it confronts is a tenacious charge of obscurantism: if the time presentism
speculates about is distinct from that which SR, and physics quite generally, theorizes about, what
then is it? The time of physics is that which is tracked by any physical clock, from atomic clocks
to biological and astronomical ones. The presentist’s time, on the other hand, cannot possibly find
any expression in the physical realm; for if it did, we could observe its regularities and compare
them to other physical ones. Unless it would show a violation of Lorentz invariance, however, these
regularities would have to accord to the Lorentz symmetry postulated by SR and would thus lead
the presentist back to the challenge as given in §2. In case it did violate Lorentz invariance, we
would have found an empirical confutation of SR. This, in turn, would signal not a compatibility
of presentism with SR, but that new physics was required. Indeed, the presentist would find
herself in the top right box of those who resolve the tension by showing that while presentism is
incompatible with SR, it is perfectly consistent with more fundamental, ‘better’ physics. I shall
turn to resolutions of this type in §5.
Time, therefore, must remain obscure on this view.8 Furthermore, Gerald Massey (1969) ac-
cused Prior’s programme of tense logic and presentism to be “grounded in bad physics and indefen-
sible metaphysics” (31f). Yet, despite this, and arguably because of its many ingenious innovations
that even Massey acknowledged, Prior’s presentism continues to be influential. Jonathan Lowe,
in his contribution to this collection (Lowe forthcoming), seems to defend a similar line to Prior
in his first comment of Section III, where he insists that we only get from the merely operational
definition of time as found in physics to the conclusion that this characterization does really track
time by additional metaphysical premises. These ancillary assumptions needed for the interpreta-
tion of the formal theoretical structure of SR can be chosen in different ways; in particular, Lowe
maintains, they can be chosen as to permit metaphysical systems with absolute time and absolute
simultaneity. Again, it is hard to see how this resolution avoids obscurantism.
What Lowe really believes is that a presentist can accept SR’s stricture that there cannot be
absolute simultaneity, as his further comments show. The way to evade the grip of the challenge, for
Lowe, is to deny that co-existence is an equivalence relation. In the classification scheme proposed
here, this resolution falls under the second compatibilist view, which now remains to be discussed.
There are, of course, many ways of modifying presentism such as to keep it in line with SR. One
important group of modifications denies that co-existence is an equivalence relation. As violating
reflexivity is not attractive, approaches in this camp either deny symmetry or transitivity. Lowe
proposes to violate transitivity, as he believes the demand that co-existence is transitive constitutes
a metaphysical assumption motivated by an eternalist understanding of temporal reality that the
presentist naturally rejects. As he most specifically explicates in comment (c) in Section III,
transitivity ought to be rejected because on the endurantist conception of persistence he maintains,
a person is wholly present at all times he or she exists, and co-exists with particular tropes of hers
at each of these times, while the tropes of hers instantiated at different times do not co-exist.9 This
last point is a distinctively presentist thesis, and insisting on the transitivity of co-existence amounts
to an eternalist prejudice in that it is assumed that the tropes at different times co-exist—or so he
8That Priorian presentism trades on the obscure is ironic, given that Prior (1967, 160) accused eternalists (or,
more precisely, detensers) of “superstition” because they “pretend not only to resurrect the dead but even to summon
forth the unborn”, in the words of Massey (1969, 23).
9A trope is a particular instance of a property or a relation, holding of, or co-existing with, the concrete particular
it characterizes.
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claims.
Let me first note how unpalatable giving up the transitivity of co-existence really is. Without
transitivity, it seems impossible to have a determinate and objective fact of the matter as to what
the sum total of existence is. Existence seems relativized if I have to accept that what exists
relative to b may not exist relative to a, even if b exists relative to a. We will soon see a more
radical version of a proposal along these lines, but I find Lowe’s proposal unattractive because it
appears to have significant costs in the currency of the objectivity of existence, while it may not
resolve the difficulties originating in SR at all. The reason why I am sceptical of its efficacy of
eliminating the tension is that it seems as if at the level of tropes, transitivity is still required. If
so, the problem returns in an unmitigated form.
But why would the transitivity of co-existence be necessary for tropes? Suppose there are three
people, Alice, Bob, and Carol, pairwise at some spatial distance from one another, but mutually
at rest. In the metaphysical picture drawn by Lowe, all three constitute a series of tropes with
which they co-exist, sequentially, at subsequent times. This much seems unproblematic, since for
one (idealized) observer, time forms a total order even in a relativistic context. But now it seems
as if there ought to be a fact of the matter which ‘Alice’-tropes co-exist with which ‘Bob’-tropes,
etc. Suppose that the Alice-trope A co-exists with the Bob-trope B and that the Bob-trope B
co-exists with the Carol-trope C. Does A co-exist with C? If so, without loss of generality, it seems
as if at least within the same frame of reference (remember that the Alice, Bob, and Carol are
mutually at rest), co-existence ought to be transitive if the relata are tropes—at least there seems
no reason why it shouldn’t be. Idealizing the tropes as being located at one spacetime point, SR
mandates that if A, B, and C are simultaneous (and hence co-exist) in the rest frame of Alice,
Bob, and Carol, then they will not be simultaneous in any other frame. And it is not the case that
this rest frame is privileged—it could have been the case that the three observers move relative
to one another. Suppose that Bob and Carol start to move relative to Alice and relative to one
another, even though they still move inertially. So within Alice’s rest frame, which is the same
rest frame as the one we had before and for which we established transitivity. But since Alice is in
no way preferred over Bob or Carol, the same should be true for their rest frames. Hence, within
each observer’s rest frame, the transitivity of co-existence with tropes as relata should be valid.
It may, however, not obtain across different frames, at least there is nothing in SR which would
decide this matter. Either it does or it doesn’t. If it does, then we are back to square one and the
challenge still stands; if it does not, then the presentist accepts that existence gets fragmented and
relativized to reference frames. The presentist of a Lowean persuasion finds himself between a rock
and a hard place.
None of this should suggest that a presentist couldn’t respond to the challenge by accepting
the lessons of SR and, accordingly, relativize existence to inertial frames, as does Kit Fine (2005,
§10, 298-307). Simultaneity, and hence co-presentness, is defined only relative to an inertial frame.
Therefore, and since for the presentist existence is tied to co-presentness, existence becomes frag-
mented in that it is only determinate with respect to a frame of reference. Co-existence is only an
equivalence relation with respect to an inertial frame, but not simpliciter, as transitivity cannot
act across frames. The price to be paid for this perfectly straightforward resolution, however, is
immense: it requires a radically new understanding of physical existence. On a standard concep-
tion of physical existence, I take it, what exists is independent not only of the subject, but also
of its kinematic state. On Fine’s view, what co-exists with me depends on how I move. Thus, if
we meet in the street, leisurely walking towards one another, what co-exists with you is entirely
and completely different from what co-exists with me (with the exception of the here-now). Fine
insists that this is a feature of his view, not a bug; but it is a feature which seriously modifies our
conception of physical existence. Many presentists, I would think, are unwilling to follow Fine in
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Figure 3: An illustration of the violation of transitivity and of the insistence on symmetry in
past-lightcone presentism
this radical step.
There are other ways to deny that co-existence, or co-presentness, is an equivalence relation.
One is suggested (but not ultimately defended) by Howard Stein (1991) and could be termed past-
lightcone presentism. Past-lightcone presentism consider all and only events on the past lightcone of
the here-now as co-existing with the here-now. Clearly, co-existence thus becomes non-symmetrical,
as is evident in Figure 3: q co-exists with p but not vice versa. The loss of transitivity is also
manifest: r co-exists with q, and q co-exists with p, but r does not co-exist with p because it is
not on the past lightcone, but inside it. To save transitivity by including the full past lightcone of
p as co-existing with p should not appeal to a presentist, unless she secretly harbours sympathies
for the growing block view. The symmetry, but not the transitivity, of co-existence can be restored
by extending the set of events which stand in the co-existence relation to p to include those events
on the future lightcone. Thus, if q co-exists with p, so does p with q. Such an extension, however,
would have one rather counterintuitive consequence (cf. Figure 3): for a distant galaxy at rest
relative to an observer on earth, events s and t far apart in time (e.g. some four million years for
Andromeda), but not in space, would both co-exist with the present event p for the earth-bound
observer. This seems a rather odd outcome for a presentist; I suspect that most past-lightcone
presentists would therefore refrain from saving symmetry.
Let’s tally the benefits and costs of past-lightcone presentism. First, this species of presentism is
clearly compatible with SR as it defines the metaphysically salient structure purely in the Lorentz-
invariant terms of the lightcone structure of spacetime. As a second advantage, co-existence tracks
epistemic accessibility: all those events co-exist with the here-now which can be causally connected
to (but not from) the here-now, e.g. by a light signal; consequently, all those events co-exist with
the here-now which can be seen, at the here-now, as occurring now. While these virtues are not
insignificant, they are outweighed by the approach’s problems. First, it is questionable to what
extent it deserves the moniker ‘presentism’ as it includes as co-existent with the here-now events
reaching arbitrarily far back into the past. There are events all the way back to, but not including,
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the big bang which co-exist with the here-now.10 Moreover, past-lightcone presentism requires
the unjustified awarding of a privilege of the spatially present over other spatial locations. The
imposition of a prerogative of the here is implicit in the position because of the unique role played
by the apex of the lightcone. The past lightcones of two distinct spacetime points are generally
distinct.11 Selecting one past lightcone as that which contains events enjoying an ontological dis-
tinction over the others thus means to spatiotemporally privilege a location—and not just temporally
as the presentist routinely does. Space and time are thus treated much more on a par than may
be usual, or desirable, for a presentist. While presentists go at great lengths offering a justification
for distinguishing the present, the past-lightcone version of presentism would only be appealing,
counterfactually, if similar justifications could be offered for the prerogative of the here-now as for
the now.
The one remaining compatibilist presentism I wish to discuss also modifies the original position,
but in rather different ways. James Harrington (2008) has defended a ‘pointilliste’ version of
presentism according to which not only is the sum total of existence restricted to the temporally
present, but it is also limited to the spatially present. This point presentism evidently relies only
on the Lorentz-invariant structure of relativistic spacetimes: single points. Thus, the challenge
mounted in §2 does not even get to the starting blocks. This solipsistic version of presentism,
however, is a very lonely view indeed: not even all of me exists! Furthermore, solipsist presentism
fails to capture the spirit of presentism, as Fine (2005, 304) reminds us, which maintains that there
is a metaphysically deep distinction between space and time in that there exists an objective ‘now’,
even though there is no equally objective ‘here’. Finally, and relatedly, a justification for privileging
this rather than that spacetime point is required, just as it was for the past-lightcone presentism.
Summarizing our findings of this section, we can safely reject the claim that SR precludes a
presentist metaphysic. Presentism is not physically impossible according to SR. Even assuming the
strict truth of SR, there are many ways in which a presentist can evade the pressure originating
from the relativity of simultaneity. All of these ways, however, incur certain costs; costs that are,
in my view, too high to justify any potential gain they might offer.
5 Incompatibilism with special relativity
There is almost universal agreement that SR is not a true theory. It assumes the complete ab-
sence of gravity, for instance. Because gravity shapes the structure of spacetime, the Minkowski
spacetime we find in SR cannot adequately describe the spacetime structure of the world we live in.
Furthermore, SR does not take any quantum effects into consideration. If a naturalistically inclined
presentist presented an argument from some physical theory better than SR that would establish
that the challenge produced in §2 would no longer go through, she would offer respite for presentism
from the besieging relativity of simultaneity. Arguments of this type count as incompatibilist be-
cause they accept the verdict from §2, but try to overturn it by rejecting SR. It is important to note
that SR is not simply rejected on a priori or otherwise antinaturalist grounds, but instead because
it is believed to be an ultimately false theory of the actual world, to be replaced by a better theory.
This naturalist assumption dictates the rules for this section: any presentist opting for this route
must produce at least an equally good (interpretation of a) theory on which the problem vanishes,
where ‘good’ is judged by the standards of physical science. This means that the metaphysician
10 Thus including events located at all cosmological times from arbitrarily close to the big bang to today. In
the standard cosmological models of Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker spacetimes, these cosmological times are
privileged against all other ways of foliating these spacetimes; cf. §5.
11Except if the spacetime lacks a property called ‘past-distinguishing’.
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must get her hands dirty and analyze some actual physics. Such an analysis very quickly leads into
a thicket of foundational questions in special and general relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum
field theory, and quantum gravity. Naturally, I cannot possibly cover all the possible physics on
which such an incompatibilist argument could turn in the remainder of this essay, but I will try to
give you a sense of where to look and how such an argument might go.
The physics invoked, or reinterpreted, by the naturalist incompatibilist is either classical, i.e.
non-quantum, or it relies on some quantum effects to get around SR’s stricture of the relativity of
simultaneity. Today, I shall focus on some ‘classical’ strategies and only briefly comment on some
quantum considerations towards the end of the essay. Among those, either a reinterpretation of SR,
or the identification of extra-structure in general relativity (GR)—a more fundamental theory than
SR—are most promising. One rather popular strategy of the first type, found e.g. in William Craig
(2001), seeks a ‘neo-Lorentzian’ reinterpretation of SR. Emulating Hendrik Lorentz’s postulation of
an immobile aether, it introduces a preferred frame of reference just as the aether would have done.
Often, however, proponents of this strategy desist from offering a particular physical mechanism
such as the aether which would physically explain the privilege awarded to one frame in particular.
The important point, of course, is that it is in principle impossible to detect the preferred frame.
Mathematically speaking, this fact gets encoded in the strict validity of Lorentz symmetry, which
still obtains. This strategy is the identical twin of the compatibilist strategy of insisting that SR
is compatible with the postulation of extra-structure as a preferred frame. The only difference
here is that the standard reading of SR is assumed to prohibit such extra-structures, and hence
rejected and supplanted by a neo-Lorentzian version which includes the preferred frame. Ultimately,
whether this strategy is considered compatibilist or incompatibilist thus boils down to the issue of
whether SR permits grafting on the extra-structure of a preferred frame, as we have already seen
e.g. in the strategy employed by Markosian (2004). I take no stance on this essentially semantic
question but will henceforth use the term ‘SR’ to include a prohibition of any preferred frames and
‘neo-Lorentzian SR’ to designate SR-cum-preferred frame.
Against the twin strategy of adding an absolute, non-empirical simultaneity it can be com-
plained, as I did above, that it violates the demands of Ockam’s razor by postulating excess entities
whose effects cannot even in principle be detected. Apart from the charge that it relies on un-
necessary entities, neo-Lorentzian SR seems to make the Relativity Principle mentioned in §2 only
accidentally true. While the Relativity Principle is of course not metaphysically necessary, let me
emphasize that neo-Lorentzian SR retracts what many consider SR’s major accomplishment, viz.
to show that not only is the Relativity Principle a deep principle of fundamental physics, but it can
consistently be maintained alongside another successful empirical generalization: the Light Postu-
late. Furthermore, standard SR and the view of spacetime it promulgates lend themselves—unlike
neo-Lorentzian SR—quite naturally to the development in understanding spacetime brought about
by GR. In the realm of GR, which liberally admits many spacetime geometries and even topologies
such that, in general, spacetimes can no longer be carved up into slices of space ordered by time.
Thus, in those worlds at least where such a foliation is not possible at all, we do not even get to the
problem of having to privilege one frame among infinitely many for no good empirical reasons—
there simply are no such global frames anymore. In other words, Neo-Lorentzian SR seems to
exhibit all the vices of ad-hockery and none of the virtues of ex ante, testable explanations with
independent support. Neo-Lorentzian theories are driven either by a refusnik attitude towards the
lessons of SR or by some more explicit metaphysical agendas; either way, they make for bad physics.
As long as we are constrained to the non-dynamical Minkowski spacetime, there is no good reason
to adopt a neo-Lorentzian preferred frame. But new possibilities open up once the narrow confines
of special-relativistic physics dehisce.
Staying within the classical incompatibilist camp though, a popular strategy utilizes the cosmo-
15
logical models of GR to reintroduce and justify a privileged time and thus an absolute simultaneity.
Motivated by the idea that no location in space, including ours, is physically privileged (the so-
called Copernican or Cosmological Principle), cosmologists assume that a necessary condition for
the Copernican Principle to hold is that spacetime is spatially homogeneous. A theorem (Walker
1944) establishes that a sufficient condition for spatial homogeneity is the exact spherical symmetry
around every point of the spacetime. The theorem also shows that if the condition of exact spherical
symmetry about every point is satisfied, then the spacetime can be foliated into spacelike hypersur-
faces of constant curvature. Spacetimes which exhibit exact spherical symmetry about every point
are the Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) spacetimes mentioned in footnote 10. The
foliation into spacelike hypersurfaces they admit is unique in that for only one such foliation it is the
case for each hypersurface that all points in it exemplify the same spatial curvature. The foliation
is thus physically privileged, and the parameter which orders the folia is called cosmological time t.
Thus, the FLRW spacetimes—the cosmological standard models—admit an absolute time and an
absolute notion of simultaneity: two events are FLRW-absolutely simultaneous just in case they are
within the same spatial hypersurface of the privileged foliation or, equivalently, occur at the same
cosmological time t. This notion of simultaneity is absolute since for any two events in an FLRW
spacetime it is either the case that they are FLRW-absolutely simultaneous or not.12
The move from SR to GR thus seems to reinvigorate the naturalist presentist’s enterprise. As
already James Jeans (1936) recognized, with apparent relief, the FLRW spacetimes make “a real
distinction between space and time”, such that we have “every justification for reverting to our
old intuitional belief that past, present, and future have real objective meanings, and are not mere
hallucinations of individual minds—in brief that we are free to believe that time is real.” (23; cited
after Lockwood (2005, 116f)) Many presentists have followed Jeans in imbuing cosmological time
with ontological significance. But this move is not without its shortcomings. Michael Berry (1989,
105) resists the inference from the fact that there is a uniquely most natural reference frame for
FLRW spacetimes—the one at rest with respect to the local matter of the universe averaged over
vast distances—to the conclusion that there is absolute space and time. I concur with Berry, but
let’s consider some more specific problems of the Jeansian proposal.
An immediate problem already noted by Kurt Go¨del (1949, 560n) is that relying on cosmological
time to define absolute time seems to yield only an approximate definition. It can only provide such
an approximation because the assumptions undergirding the FLRW spacetimes are idealizations;
of course, our actual universe is embarrassingly obviously not spatially homogeneous. In fact, it is
hard to imagine how life would be possible in a perfectly homogeneous universe. So at small scales,
we find blatant inhomogeneities. The question thus arises at which scales the idealizing assumption
of spatial homogeneity is valid within the limits demanded of the approximation. This is Go¨del’s
point: at no scale smaller than the full universe have different spatial regions in general the exact
same average spatial curvature; thus, to make the definition precise, either nothing short of the full
universe will work, or else arbitrary elements “such as the size of the regions or the weight function
to be used in the computation of the mean motion of matter” (ibid.) must be introduced. Judging
from this, Go¨del found it “doubtful whether there exists a precise definition which has so great
merits, that there would be sufficient reason to consider exactly the time thus obtained as the true
one.” (ibid.)
To use an analogy from Michael Lockwood (2005, 118), just as the surface of earth is idealized as
a perfect sphere, or as a perfect oblate spheroid, when in reality it is, at least from up close enough,
a rocky asteroid, the hypersurfaces of FLRW spacetimes are idealized to be perfectly homogeneous
when in actuality they are, at least from up close enough, rather inhomogeneous. The equivalence
12For a more systematic account of FLRW spacetimes, cf. e.g. Wald (1984, Ch. 5).
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classes of FLRW-absolutely simultaneous events thus rely on an idealized division of space and
time which may locally well be violated. In all this, it remains utterly mysterious how this highly
idealized construction connects to our intuitions regarding temporal becoming and the present. If
the absolute time constructed from this idealizing averaging procedure over vast cosmic scales is
the time which determines what is the present, then how does the human perceptual and cognitive
apparatus latch on to this idealized structure? In order for us to have truthful intuitions regarding
the present, as a necessary condition, there must be a causal story of how humans pick up the
present so defined. There are reasons to believe that such a causal mechanism cannot operate
even in principle—after all, the spacelike hypersurfaces of constant spatial curvature which define
the present extend across all of the universe and include parts from where light signals can only
reach earth in a few billion years. Clearly, our presentist intuitions, should we have them, must be
generated in a different way.
That this will not be trivial to resolve can be gleaned from explicating a useful distinction
between ‘public’ and ‘private’ spaces made by Wolfgang Rindler (1981).13 Both public and private
spaces are spacelike hypersurfaces of a four-dimensional general-relativistic spacetime. Consider an
infinite number of test particles whose trajectories are timelike geodesics. A private space then is
a spacelike hypersurface generated by (spacelike) geodesics which are orthogonal to the timelike
curve of a particular test particle. This is, at it were, the test particle’s own private ‘space’, viz.
the space orthogonal to its ‘time’. A public space, on the other hand, is a spacelike hypersurface
which is everywhere orthogonal to a family of timelike curves. Restricting ourselves to the case
of ‘open’ FLRW spacetime (i.e., the spatial curvature at events in the hypersurfaces of constant
spatial curvature is non-positive), the so-called Penrose diagram given in Figure 4 gives a graphical
illustration of the difference between private and public space. A Penrose diagram represents the
relative to Γ
relative to γ
private space
worldline γ
test particles
worldlines of
I − (t = 0)
I + (t =∞)
i0
singularity
coordinate
(t =const)
surfaces
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public space
Figure 4: Penrose diagram of an open FLRW spacetime (with p = Λ = 0) with a family Γ of
worldlines of test particles
13The distinction originated in Edward A Milne’s discussion of his eponymous spacetime, but was generalized by
Rindler (1981). I thank David Malament for teaching this material to me.
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conformal structure of a spacetime, i.e., a way of representing the structure of an infinitely extended
spacetime in a finite diagram. The straight boundary lines represent infinity, the wavy boundary
lines a singularity, the dashed boundary lines symmetry axes or coordinate singularities, and points
points. Boundary null surfaces are labelled I (read ‘scri’), with I + and I − representing future
and past null infinity, respectively, and boundary points i, with i+ and i− designating future and
past timelike infinity, respectively, and i0 spacelike infinity. In Figure 4, any timelike geodesic
originates in I − and ends in i+, and null geodesics start in I − and finish in I +, and spacelike
geodesics originate and end in i0. (But non-geodesic curves do not follow these rules).
Let us consider a family Γ of timelike geodesics representing the worldlines of test particles, as
well as one particular representative γ of that family (cf. Figure 4). As indicated in Figure 4, the
public space relative to Γ at a given time t = t′ is just the spacelike hypersurface t = t′ of constant
spatial curvature of the cosmologically privileged foliation. The private space relative to γ, however,
only intersects this public space at the very point which jointly belongs to the worldline γ and the
public space relative to Γ. It should be noted that both these spaces are supposed to represent
‘space’ as it is given at the same time t = t′, just once with respect to a family of observers or
test particles and once for just one observer. The two notions of space are clearly inequivalent. In
particular, the private space curves back onto the initial singularity I − of the ‘big bang’, including
arbitrarily early moments of cosmological time. A proposition by Don Page (1983) establishes that
private space is finite in any homogeneous and isotropic general-relativistic cosmological spacetime
which is expanding (and satisfies certain other conditions).
Thus, the presentist is forced to disambiguate between the two notions of space. At most one
of them correctly captures the structure of the spatially extended present. But which one to pick?
Given that the presentist’s original inclination was to utilize the cosmologically privileged foliation
to re-introduce absolute simultaneity, the notion of public space seems more promising. It certainly
commands the more objective validity in that it does not randomly, or at least unjustifiedly, select
one worldline to fill a special role. In FLRW spacetimes, the public space also doesn’t get arbitrarily
close to the big bang, but instead tracks a more natural notion of simultaneity. Public space is
only well-defined in spacetimes which do not rotate or, equivalently, for which there are families of
worldlines such that the spacetime can be foliated into a family of spacelike hypersurfaces which
are orthogonal to the worldlines.14 Thus, the infamous Go¨del spacetime does not permit public
spaces. Perhaps this is not a big loss for the public-space presentist; but it does make presentism
vulnerable to non-standard spacetime structures, which may well be actual for all we know.
Would it be safer for the presentist to bet on private space as encoding the structure of the
spatially extended present? After all, this seems what a finite, earthbound observer could hope to
construct. It can often be constructed even in spacetimes in which no well-defined public space
exists, such as in the rotating universes which fail to be hypersurface orthogonal. But we need
not go far to recognize the weaknesses such a private-space-based approach would have. It is
evidently egocentric as distant observers will never agree on what the present is, just as in the
case of solipsist and past-lightcone presentisms. Strictly speaking, you and I will always disagree
about which events are present. Symmetry (and transitivity) is lost again, as those temporal parts
of you which are real according to me-now take a temporal part of me to be real which is in the
causal past of the me-now. Since different observers have different private spaces, and only one
of them gets the ontological privilege, a justification for singling out this, but not that, observer
is again required. It is hard to see how such a justification could be forthcoming. Ironically then,
private-space presentism unduly awards an ontologically special status to earthbound observers
after having relied on modern cosmology whose Cosmological Principle exactly denies any special
14Cf. David Malament, ‘How space can be (and is) finite’, talk at UCSD on 8 June 2009.
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status to us-now.
There are two further repulsive features of private-space presentism. First, private spaces are
not in general extendible to universal spaces, i.e., even for some causally benign spacetimes, they
do not intersect the worldlines of all observers, so that some observers have no temporal parts
which are ever real.15 Second, and just as for past-lightcone presentism, in FLRW spacetimes part
of an observer’s private space will always be arbitrarily close to the big bang. This seems hard to
reconcile with the presentist intuition that it is the present, not the past, that deserves the noble
epithet of reality.
In sum, FLRW spacetimes offer a much less hospitable venue to a presentist metaphysic as the
incompatibilist presentist may have hoped. But not all classical hope is lost. As Bradley Monton
(2006) has reminded us, GR contains a large class of spacetimes which seem amenable to a princi-
pled procedure for introducing unique foliations into space and time, one that even avoids the gross
idealizations that paved the way to cosmological time. This procedure slices the four-dimensional
spacetime into spacelike hypersurfaces parametrized by constant mean (extrinsic) curvature, or
CMC.16 I will spare you a detailed assessment of the prospects of presentism based on CMC fo-
liations, as I have given one in Wu¨thrich (2010). But my conclusions there were negative: apart
from numerous technical problems and from the callowness of the approach, the most devastating
problem was even if the large-scale structure of our actual universe is best described by a space-
time which admits a CMC foliation, and even if one of the folia of this CMC foliation is rightly
distinguished as the present, it remains far from clear, to put it mildly, how it can be that it is this
CMC foliation that our presentist intuitions are tracking. Why should our sense that the present
is somehow ontologically special be sensitive to the constant mean extrinsic curvature of spacelike
hypersurfaces? Clearly, it is not enough to simply identify a folium of a certain constant mean
curvature as the present and believe that one has explained our presentist intuitions.
While this seemingly exhausts at least the most obvious and the most viable classical strategies
available to the incompatibilist presentist, many presentists have turned to quantum physics and
have drawn new hope from several aspects of the quantum. Doing them the justice they deserve
will have to wait for another day, so let me just list the two most obvious routes that have been pur-
sued, with a few quick comments. They both concern particular interpretations of non-relativistic
quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics and collapse theories. As an example of utilizing the
latter, John Lucas (1999, 10)—a later temporal part of the compatibilist mentioned in §4—offers
a forceful statement of how collapse interpretations provide a home for a physically distinguished
present, adorned with the temporal asymmetry so beloved by presentists:
There is a worldwide tide of actualization—collapse into eigenstate—constituting a pre-
ferred foliation by hyperplanes (not necessarily flat) of co-presentness sweeping through
the universe—a tide which determines an absolute present [...] Quantum mechanics
[...] not only insists on the arrow being kept in time, but distinguishes a present as the
boundary between an alterable future and an unalterable past.
If the collapses invoked by Lucas are to be real physical mechanisms—which they would have
to be in order to fill the role assigned to them by collapse presentists—, then they occur in a
particular basis. For instance, in a GRW collapse theory, the collapses occur in the position basis.
Whichever basis the collapse presentist chooses, her selection must be given a physical justification.
15More accurately, there exist private spaces in globally hyperbolic spacetimes which are not Cauchy surfaces.
16This curvature is defined as the trace of the extrinsic curvature, i.e., of a mathematical magnitude which quantifies
how the three-dimensional hypersurface is embedded into the four-dimensional spacetime. It thus differs from the
purely three-dimensional, and hence intrinsic,‘spatial’ curvature utilized in the introduction of the cosmological time
in FLRW spacetimes.
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I have no reason to assume that this can’t be done, but would like to emphasize that it does not
suffice to simply invoke collapse as a physical mechanism to distinguish the present and leave it
at that. Furthermore, the collapses’ blatant violation of Lorentz symmetry is usually regarded by
physicists not as a metaphysical virtue, but as a physical vice. Therefore, physicists are searching
for a relativistic version of collapse interpretations such as GRW. Such relativistic collapse theories
should be expected to no longer rely on a preferred foliation of spacetime, but instead to collapse
the wave function in a Lorentz-invariant way.17 In fact, given alternative proposals to solve the
measurement problem in quantum mechanics such as Everettian many-worlds theories and hidden-
variables theories such as Bohmian mechanics, it is evident that quantum mechanics does not
require collapse at all. Among those working in the foundations of quantum mechanics today, I
would estimate that only a minority advocates collapse interpretations. The rejection of collapse
interpretations, of course, does not entail an impossibility for the presentist to find a physical
structure incarnating her metaphysical fantasy. Perhaps Bohmian mechanics, or non-local Bell
correlations, or the quantization of spacetime, offers an attractive route to its fulfillment. But this,
as I said, is the topic for another occasion.
As a general reminder to compatibilist and incompatibilist presentists alike, let me finish by
stressing that the strictures of SR are quite strong; Lorentz symmetry is fantastically well confirmed
in many disparate contexts and for many different phenomena.18 As a consequence of this high
degree of experimental and observational confirmation, it would be rational to expect Lorentz
symmetry to be part of the true fundamental theory—although there is admittedly more to be
said here about possible high-energy corrections of exact Lorentz symmetry. Rather than as a
theory which has been supplanted by GR, relativistic quantum field theory, and—ultimately—
a quantum theory of gravity, we should regard SR as a ‘second-order constraint’ on these more
fundamental theories, as I have explicated in Wu¨thrich (2010, §4). Quite generally, presentists
often underestimate the dialectical work that needs to be done to get around SR’s ruling that
simultaneity is relative.
6 Taking stock: the grim prospects of presentism
In conclusion, we have found that fundamental physics does not uniquely determine the metaphysics
of time, and hence does not entail the denial of presentism. But it does impose constraints which
any naturalist worth her salt must respect. Metaphysics need not be subservient to physics, but to
completely ignore pertinent experimental findings and theoretical insights coming from the sciences
testifies to philosophical hybris par excellence. It is worthwhile to recall that the naturalism that
I have asked the reader to adopt is rather mild: it simply demands that no physically possible
worlds are metaphysically impossible, where physical possibility gets judged by our best physical
theories. Once we engage in a detailed analysis of just what it is that our best physical theories
state as possible, we recognize that maintaining presentism, while defensible along many routes,
bears a high cost. Most of this essay has been concerned with detailing that bill.
While the costs are high along all routes, the toll they extract may be quite different—presentists
get to pick among many different poisons. But both sides of the balance sheet must be considered,
costs as well as gains. To give a detailed analysis of the real or alleged gains in adopting presentism
remains beyond the scope of this essay, but they surely include a claimed accordance with our
17This is indeed what happens in the only current candidate for such a theory, Tumulka (2006)’s ‘rGRWf’.
18For an authoritative recent review of the main standard tests of Lorentz symmetry, cf. Will (2005a,b). Salart
et al. (2008) have tested for a privileged frame in the context of non-local Bell correlations and found no indication
that there is any.
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intuitions, in particular in that it seems to make sense of the apparently so prevalent becoming and
and ever-present transience in our world. It is this dynamical ‘umph’, this whoosh, that presentists
often cite as their main explanatory accomplishment.
The lesson I wish to draw from my analysis is that the tension between modern physics and
presentism can be resolved, but that all resolutions either require unpalatable metaphysics or specu-
lative science, which our best current knowledge cannot support. On the first option, the presentist
position may become so disfigured as to more than offset any advantage that may have been gained
by its accordance with our intuitions. Finally, it should be noted that in order for this claimed
advantage of presentism to come into play at all, the presentist must identify the physical structure
which could justifiably play the ontologically special role and the mechanism which explains how
our temporal intuitions arise from this physical structure. After all, the presentist draws an infer-
ence to the best explanation from our intuitions to the fundamentally privileged ontological status
of the present. Hence, however this present is characterized, there better be an account of what it
is and how it causally affects us in a way as to give rise to our temporal experiences. And there
seems to be no hope of delivering such an account if either the structure identified as the present or
the causal mechanism are not physically tractable. To explicate this story is a tall order for both
compatibilist and incompatibilist presentists.
I submit, therefore, that modern physics renders the prospects of presentism quite grim. As
this essay has shown, however, presentism ought to be of interest not just for the metaphysician,
but also for the philosopher of physics, as its analysis cuts deep into the foundational meat of many
a physical theory.
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